



Netherlands Enterprise Agency

# *Letter from the Minister of Climate Policy and Green Growth*

*Commissioned by the ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth*

*>> Sustainable. Agricultural. Innovative.  
International.*

|         |                                                             |
|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| 31 239  | Stimulation of sustainable energy production                |
| 33 561  | Structural Vision for Offshore Wind Energy (SV WoZ)         |
| No. 459 | Letter from the Minister of Climate Policy and Green Growth |

To the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the States General

The Hague, 11 June 2026

According to the Offshore Wind Energy Action Plan published on 16 September 2025, the Government will invest in 2 GW of offshore wind energy in 2026 by licensing Sites IJmuiden Ver (IJV) Gamma-A (1 GW) and Gamma-B (1 GW) with a subsidy procedure ("tender").<sup>1</sup> These offshore wind farms are an investment in clean and affordable domestically produced energy for current and future generations, contribute to climate objectives and increase the resilience of our energy system in the event of geopolitical unrest. Offshore wind energy is the engine of the energy transition and contributes to a sustainable Netherlands.

The Government previously informed the House about the draft regulations (Ministerial Orders), after which a market consultation took place.<sup>2</sup> Through this letter, I inform the House about final tender arrangements, with which the Government is taking the next important step in the development of these offshore wind farms. The final Ministerial Orders outlining the tender regulations will be published in the Government Gazette shortly.

In addition, through this letter I am implementing a number of motions, namely: a motion by member Jumelet et al. on the feed-in tariff<sup>3</sup>, a motion by member van Oosterhout et al. on ecological and circular criteria for offshore wind<sup>4</sup>, a motion by members Kröger and Thijssen on a domestic demand obligation<sup>5</sup>, a motion by member van Oosterhout et al. on the North Sea Pact<sup>6</sup> and a motion by member Klos et al. on the bill for *contracts for difference*<sup>7</sup>. Finally, in this letter, the Government

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<sup>1</sup> Offshore Wind Action Plan, 16 September 2026, appendix to Parliamentary Paper 33561, no. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 33 561, no. 99 and Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 33 561, no. 101.

<sup>3</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 36 800 XXIII, no. 38.

<sup>4</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 31239, no. 448.

<sup>5</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/2026, 31239, no. 432.

<sup>6</sup> Parliamentary Papers II, 2025/2026, 31239 no. 447.

<sup>7</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 31239, no. 455.

answers a question from member Vermeer about the responsibilities of various ministers in the field of shared use, specifically passive fishing.

### **Increase in maximum tender amount due to uncertainty in feed-in tariff**

To determine the maximum tender amount, the Government requested advice from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (*Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving*, PBL). PBL advised on the maximum tender amount for which the majority of the market is expected to have a positive business case<sup>8</sup>, using an estimate of the business case for wind farm developers, an estimate of expected energy prices, a market consultation, and an assessment of competition. In its advice, PBL was unable to take into account the effect on wind farm developers' costs resulting from the feed-in tariff as proposed by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), because this requires further elaboration of the feed-in tariff. The Government is also unable to give an estimate of the increased costs. As a result, PBL cannot make an updated estimate of the effect of the feed-in tariff on the business case for wind farm developers. In addition, PBL has indicated that it cannot provide a new estimate of the competition and the effect on electricity prices in the short term. PBL has therefore not been asked to carry out a new exercise.

The feed-in tariff risk reduces the likelihood of a positive business case within the budgetary scope of the tenders. Market interest may decline as a result, limiting competition and potentially leading to failed tenders. The failure of the tenders would lead to further delays in achieving climate objectives and strengthening energy independence. A failed tender also results in high social costs due to delays at TenneT and negative consequences for the (Dutch) supply chain, which is strongly intertwined with the economy.

The Government attaches great value to the continuation of the roll-out of offshore wind farms.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, in view of the risk and uncertainties of the feed-in tariff, the Cabinet has decided to continue providing sufficient budgetary scope for two competitive tenders for offshore wind energy by increasing the maximum tender amount for IJV Gamma-A from €104/MWh to €117/MWh, and for IJV Gamma-B from €103/MWh to €116/MWh. The budgetary scope provided is expected to contribute to increased competition, which may result in a lower winning tender amount<sup>10</sup> and thus lower costs for the Government.

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<sup>8</sup> Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 16 January 2026, Advice offshore wind tender 2026, Maximum tender amount for the TOWOZ concept.

<sup>9</sup> Offshore Wind Action Plan, 16 September 2025, number 2025D39426.

<sup>10</sup> Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 16 January 2026, Advice offshore wind tender 2026, Maximum tender amount for the TOWOZ concept, p. 14.

The Government is pleased with the support and interest from the sector for these tenders through their enthusiastic and constructive contribution before, during and after the consultation on the tender schemes.

### **Feed-in tariff risk**

Since 2023, ACM has been investigating the introduction of a producer tariff, whereby not only the customer, but also the producer pays for the electricity grid; the feed-in tariff. In a press release dated 30 April 2026, ACM confirmed it will proceed with development of a feed-in tariff.<sup>11</sup> However, there is currently no clarity regarding the design, operation and expected level of the tariff. As a result, there is uncertainty in the market for electricity producers, which puts pressure on the chances for success of offshore wind energy tenders from 2026 onwards. After all, due to the lack of clarity, it is difficult for a wind farm developer to assess how the feed-in tariff should be priced into the business case. As a result, they may either apply a (too) high risk premium for this, which could result in a negative business case and reduce the chance of success of the tender or create the risk of oversubsidisation, or apply a risk premium that is too low, which increases the risk that no final investment decision can ultimately be made after obtaining the permit.

In the coming months, ACM will prepare a draft decision containing choices regarding the design of the feed-in tariff, a transition period, and the possible exclusion of certain producers. For a maximum amount, ACM will also look at the German feed-in tariff. This information comes too late for the adoption of the final tender arrangements for IJV Gamma-A and -B with which wind farm developers can prepare an application. However, providing as much information as possible from ACM before the tender is concluded will contribute to the market being better able to price in the risk, thereby reducing the aforementioned risks. In a letter to ACM, I have pointed out the effect that this uncertainty has on these tenders for offshore wind energy, as well as on the opening of the SDE++ in 2026. This letter is attached. With this, I hereby comply with the motion by member Jumelet et al.<sup>12</sup> ACM has indicated that it intends to clarify the level and form of a feed-in tariff as soon as possible.

The introduction of a feed-in tariff may also have affect the business case of wind farms that have already been permitted. I am in discussions with ACM so that it understands the consequences of this and take this into account in the design of a possible feed-in tariff.

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<sup>11</sup> <https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/acm-geleidelijke-introductie-invoedingstarief-moet-bijdragen-aan-efficienter-gebruik-elektriciteitsnet>

<sup>12</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 36 800 XXIII, no. 38.

### Increased maximum tender amount

Raising the maximum tender amount for IJV Gamma-A and -B offers the market the opportunity to price in the risk of the feed-in tariff. Market parties are expected to include the risk of the foreseeable development of the feed-in tariff in the application. After the permit has been granted, there is no scope to enter into discussions with the Government regarding possible compensation once more information has become available about the design and level of the feed-in tariff.

The increased maximum tender amount leads to the following expected cash expenditure and subsidy ceiling for IJV Gamma-A and -B compared to the tender amounts as included in the draft Ministerial Orders:

| IJmuiden Ver Gamma- A | Cash reservation incl 10% price risk buffer | Subsidy ceiling  |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------|
| At €104/MWh           | €2.379 billion                              | €3.978 billion   |
| At €117/MWh           | €3.159 billion                              | €4.758 billion   |
| Difference            | + €0.780 billion                            | + €0.780 billion |

| IJmuiden Ver Gamma- B | Cash reservation incl 10% price risk buffer | Subsidy ceiling  |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------|
| At €103/MWh           | €2.271 billion                              | €3.918 billion   |
| At €116/MWh           | €3.051 billion                              | €4.698 billion   |
| Difference            | + €0.780 billion                            | + €0.780 billion |

The opening budget is equal to the commitment budget, which corresponds to the maximum subsidy amount to be paid out. The opening budget is based on the maximum obligation, i.e. the maximum amount that the recipient can receive based on the decision. This is only the case with long-term very low electricity prices and high electricity production. The increase of €1.560 billion in the commitment budget for TOWOZ in 2027 (the date of decision) will be included in the budget in the Draft Budget 2027.

The expected cash expenditure is expected to be significantly lower, because in the event of higher prices, the subsidy amount to be paid will be adjusted for income from the market for the supply of electricity. The expected cash expenditure is estimated based on the multi-year forecast of electricity prices. The actual cash expenditure incurred during the term of the subsidy is corrected for the actual electricity prices, as is the case with the SDE++.

The 16 January 2026 Letter to Parliament regarding IJV Gamma-A<sup>13</sup> states that the subsidy intensity is €220/tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> with a tender amount of €104/MWh. At

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<sup>13</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 33 561, no. 99.

€117/MWh, the subsidy intensity is €278/tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>. TenneT's investments in the offshore grid have not been taken into account in the calculation of the subsidy intensity. The subsidy intensity may be lower if the winning tender amount is lower and/or if the subsidy payment is lower during the term due to higher than estimated electricity prices.

### **Coverage of maximum tender amount**

Due to the increase in the maximum tender amount, a total reserve of approximately €6.21 billion is required for the IJV Gamma-A and -B tenders. These tenders were allocated a reserve of €4.744 billion. The reservation for the Offshore Wind Action Plan still contained approximately €93 million. For the remaining €1.466 billion required, funds reserved in the Coalition Agreement for the roll-out of offshore wind energy up to 40 GW will be used. This means that raising the maximum tender amount will not be at the expense of other Government objectives. This will be incorporated into the 2027 draft budget.

At the time of the reservation in the Coalition Agreement for the 40 GW of offshore wind energy, maximum tender amounts of € 104/MWh and € 103/MWh were assumed for IJV Gamma-A and -B respectively. Increasing the maximum tender amount for this combined 2 GW may therefore be at the expense of the opening of future tenders for offshore wind farms if the winning tender amount ultimately exceeds €104/MWh and €103/MWh respectively. If the winning bids for IJV Gamma-A and -B equal the increased maximum, this one-off increase will theoretically reduce the target achievement by 0.6 GW compared to the 40 GW. This means that price support for future tenders must be cheaper than what the reservation is based on, or that fewer sites can be permitted with price support. However, the Government expects the winning tender amount to be lower than the maximum due to increased market interest and competition due to the budgetary leeway provided. In that case, the effect on the target achievement will be smaller. In addition, this reservation is based on market conditions at the time of the conclusion of the Coalition Agreement. Developments in electricity demand, electricity prices and production costs will continue to influence the resources required per GW and the achievement of offshore wind energy targets in the coming years. The actual effect of this increase on the level of future tender amounts cannot therefore yet be determined. Prior to each tender round, PBL will be asked to advise on the maximum tender amounts for that round, taking into account circumstances at the time. The Government intends to share the new Offshore Wind Energy Roadmap with the House of Representatives at the end of this year and will therefore then further discuss the achievement of targets for offshore wind energy.

### **Ecological and circular measures for offshore wind farms**

The Government is prescribing ambitious ecological and circular economy measures for these offshore wind farms. Ecological measures are necessary to limit negative

effects on nature and strengthen nature where possible. For example, the Government has included mandatory regulations in the Wind Farm Site Decisions for these sites that limit the effect on nature as much as possible, such as a standard to minimise underwater noise during pile-driving work, and to strengthen nature, such as nature-inclusive construction. The Government will also continue to focus on knowledge development, so that the latest knowledge can be incorporated into the permitting process.

The Government has included circular requirements in the tender regulations, such as that all rotor blades must be at least 70% recyclable. In addition, the Government is working with the wind sector on a circular roadmap for offshore wind, which will provide insight into the next steps that can be taken for the circular roll-out of offshore wind energy.

Finally, the Government remains committed to working on circular and ecological measures for offshore wind farms within the EU and NSEC frameworks, for example in discussions about the implementation of the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) for offshore wind tenders. In doing so, the Government is implementing the motion by Oosterhout et al. regarding these ecological and circular criteria.<sup>14</sup>

## **Procedure**

The draft Ministerial Orders for both sites have been subject to public consultation. In response to the feedback received, various amendments and clarifications have been made to the final tender arrangements, in particular with regard to the requirements of the European NZIA. After this Letter to Parliament has been sent, the final Ministerial Orders for both sites will be published in the Government Gazette.

The formal notification for state aid approval will then be submitted to the European Commission. State aid approval is expected a few months later.

Both tenders open on Thursday 26 November and close on Thursday 10 December at 17:00. The Government expects to be able to award the permits in the first quarter of 2027. Wind farms at IJV Gamma-A and -B are expected to be commissioned in 2032.

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<sup>14</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 31239, no. 448.

### **Motion regarding domestic demand obligation**

In this Letter to Parliament, the Government also implements the motion by members Kröger and Thijssen.<sup>15</sup> The Government has investigated the extent to which a domestic demand obligation would be effective in boosting demand creation nationally, including the options Government itself has, at all levels, to increase demand for wind energy. The Government has held exploratory discussions about this with Gasunie and Nederlandse Spoorwegen, two public entities that consume a lot of electricity. In addition, the Government has spoken with grid operators about possibilities of greening the purchase of grid losses.

An important consideration here is that implementing measures for green demand creation is appropriate at EU level, as is currently the case with lead markets, and not at the national level.

An estimate of the total electricity consumption of the public sector in the Netherlands is that it amounts to less than 10% of the total Dutch electricity use and can therefore make a significant contribution to national demand creation. A significant part of public sector electricity consumption is met with sustainable electricity. This can be demonstrated with 'guarantees of origin' from within and outside the Netherlands and is therefore not automatically or exclusively sourced from, for example, Dutch offshore wind farms. Electricity grid operators are currently exploring whether grid losses can be greened with, among other things, electricity from Dutch offshore wind farms. The Government is positive about grid operators actively looking at the possibilities of further greening their grid losses.

A domestic demand obligation for offshore wind energy is at odds with other Government objectives and obligations. For example, the Government and organisations that perform tasks on behalf of Government usually deal with tenders and EU procurement rules when purchasing energy, in order to promote transparency and competition. A preference for wind energy from Dutch offshore wind farms over other renewable energy sources is legally complex and challenging. In addition, this does not fit within the Northwest European electricity market framework aiming to increase the exchange of electricity and further integrate electricity markets. Moreover, this may be in violation of the free movement of goods and services in the European Union.

One of the causes of the deteriorating market conditions for offshore wind energy is the lagging pace in expected development of large-scale demand. With the Coalition Agreement, including the commitment to subsidies (TOWOZ) and contracts for difference, the Government is investing in offshore wind energy in the short and long term. The Government, in collaboration with Invest-NL, is also committed to

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<sup>15</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/2026, 31239, no. 432.

the development of a *Corporate Power Purchase Agreement (CPPA)* guarantee fund.<sup>16</sup> This guarantee fund enables more companies to enter into an agreement with, for example, a wind farm for the purchase of electricity. The first pilot(s) are planned for 2027. The SDE++ opening rounds also stimulate sustainability, including large-scale electrification. In the update of the National Energy System Plan, which will be sent to the House in September, the Government will address the development of both electricity supply and demand.

### **Shared use within wind farms**

Member of Parliament Vermeer (BBB) asked a question about passive fishing in the Ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth's budget debate on 12 February 2018.<sup>17</sup> This question is: *'What are the different responsibilities of the ministries (KGG, I&W and LVVN) in the field of shared use, specifically passive fishing, and what steps have already been taken?'*

In the spatial planning process of the North Sea, the aim is to achieve a balance between the energy transition, food transition and nature in conjunction with other uses. The Minister of Climate Policy and Green Growth is responsible for the policy and permits for offshore wind energy. The space between wind turbines, taking into account a safety zone around the turbines, is not part of the permit for the wind farm, but is shared use space. Use of the North Sea, including shared use, must be consistent with the ecological carrying capacity of the North Sea. The Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management is primarily responsible for spatial planning in the North Sea. The Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management coordinates the general policy for shared use. Policy development regarding the forms of shared use for aquaculture, passive fishing and nature falls under the responsibility of the Minister and State Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature. Policy development for the form of shared use for other kinds of sustainable energy generation and storage falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Climate Policy and Green Growth.

To facilitate shared use within offshore wind farms, a so-called area passport guide is drawn up for all wind farms included in the Roadmap. These are available for the Borssele, Hollandse Kust (zuid) and Hollandse Kust (noord) Wind Farm Zones. In this way, space is offered for passive fishing, among other things.

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<sup>16</sup> The Offshore Wind Energy Action Plan (Parliamentary Paper II 2025/2026, 33561, no. 91) describes the guarantee fund for 'corporate Power Purchase Agreements' in detail.

<sup>17</sup> In passive fishing, it is the fish that swim into nets or bite into hooks. Examples are fishing with pots, standing nets and handline fishing. Active fishing involves methods that involve moving the net to catch fish.

On 8 April 2026, the State Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature published a call for proposals in the Government Gazette for opportunities for experimental passive fishing in the Hollandse Kust (zuid) and Hollandse Kust (noord) Wind Farm Zones.<sup>18</sup> A call for proposals for passive fishing will also follow for the Borssele Wind Farm Zone. Within the Borssele Wind Farm Zone, more space has become available for passive fishing after an evaluation process. As announced in the Memorandum on Scope and Level of Detail for the North Sea Programme 2028-2033<sup>19</sup>, the North Sea Programme 2028-2033 aims to mark the transition from passive fishing as an experiment to a commercial roll-out of passive fishing.

### **North Sea Pact**

The House has requested to be informed about discussions being held in the context of a North Sea Pact (motion by member van Oosterhout et al.).<sup>20</sup> The Government endorses the importance of developing electricity demand, supply and infrastructure in conjunction with each other. The update of the National Energy System Plan discusses this coordination in more detail. This update will be shared with the House in September. In parallel, the Government is exploring, with industry associations from both supply and demand and with grid operators, what additional possibilities exist to align supply, demand and infrastructure. These discussions are being expanded to include a broader representation of stakeholders. The Government will enter into discussions with nature organisations to explore whether they can also play a role in this. By the end of 2026 at the latest, the House will be informed in more detail regarding the starting points offered by this approach.

### **In conclusion**

The success of the tenders for IJV Gamma-A and -B is important for energy independence, contribution to climate objectives, sustainability of industry and maintenance of a robust supply chain that is strongly intertwined with the Dutch economy.

The Government continues to take steps towards a continuous and realistic roll-out of offshore wind energy. This also applies to future permitting of offshore wind farms through contracts for difference.<sup>21</sup> The Government expects to submit the Bill enabling contracts for difference to the House of Representatives before the summer. In doing so, the Government is complying with the motion by member Klos

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<sup>18</sup> [New version of the Borssele Area Passport Guide | North Sea counter](#)

<sup>19</sup> [Memorandum on the scope and level of detail of the North Sea Programme 2028 - 2033](#)

<sup>20</sup> Parliamentary Papers II, 2025/2026, 31239 no. 447.

<sup>21</sup> Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, *Letter to Parliament on two-way contracts for the settlement of differences between solar PV and wind energy*, 20 March 2026 (Parliamentary Paper 31239, no. 445).

et al.<sup>22</sup> The Government is pleased to present the House with a technical briefing on this Bill in advance. In order to ensure that the Bill is dealt with quickly, this technical briefing can take place in the near term, for example before or shortly after the summer recess. This is also in line with the wishes of the House as indicated in the debate on renewable energy and energy saving on 15 April.

The Minister of Climate Policy and Green Growth,  
S. van Veldhoven-van der Meer

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<sup>22</sup> Parliamentary Papers II 2025/26, 31239, no. 455.

**Appendix 1:** Substantiation of effectiveness, efficiency and evaluation in accordance with the Government Accounts Act 3.1.1

| Part               | Explanation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Goals              | <p>Offshore wind energy makes a major contribution to society. In this way, it contributes to energy independence, the Dutch economy, making the Netherlands more sustainable and the supply chain. The Roadmap for approximately 21 GW of offshore wind energy around 2030 outlines a roll-out path for the development of offshore wind energy that should contribute to investment decisions in offshore wind and the sustainability of industry. It also follows from the North Sea Wind Energy Infrastructure Plan that a robust 30 GW in 2040 applies as the lower limit for offshore wind energy needed to enable the sustainability plans of the Netherlands and industry.</p> <p>However, the roll-out of offshore wind energy according to the path envisaged in the Offshore Wind Energy Roadmap has come under pressure in recent years as a result of sharply increased development costs and decreased and uncertain revenues for wind farm developers. This leads to a direct impact on achieving climate targets and energy independence, puts a brake on the economy, slows down or leads to the cancellation of making industry more sustainable, and has adverse consequences for the supply chain.</p> |
| Policy instruments | <p>The instrument is the licensing of offshore wind energy with the subsidy procedure. This means that a winning application in the tender will obtain a permit under the Offshore Wind Energy Act and a subsidy decision under the Decree on the Stimulation of Sustainable Energy Production and Climate Transition, which follows the SDE++ system.</p> <p>The subsidy for offshore wind energy works according to the same system as the SDE++ scheme, with which the Minister of Climate Policy and Green Growth supports companies that generate sustainable energy or apply techniques that reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The Minister will compensate the unprofitable part of a project: the difference between the costs of the sustainable technology and the revenues from the market. If the market price is lower than the tender amount of the application, a subsidy will be paid. With higher electricity prices, the amount of cash expenditure decreases. The payment is made based on the actual production achieved. As a result, this system ensures that companies</p>                                                                                                                           |

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|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                           | <p>receive support for making sustainable projects financially feasible in the most cost-effective way possible.</p> <p>Such a form of support can still be used until mid-2027. From July 2027, the European Commission will require price certainty support for renewable electricity projects only in the form of <i>Contracts for Difference (CfDs)</i>. This is mandatory under European regulations and an instrument that is already widely used abroad. CfD is currently still being developed in national legislation. CfDs offer the possibility of funds flowing back to the State if the electricity price is above the <i>strike price</i>, the level at which a developer has a profitable business case.</p>                                                                                |
| Financial consequences for the Government | Based on the maximum tender amount of €117/MWh, the expected cash expenditure is estimated at approximately €3.159 billion (over the period 2032-2046) and a commitment budget/subsidy ceiling of €4.758 billion. The reservation and the estimate will be lower if the winning tender amount is lower than the maximum tender amount. The actual expenditure depends on the development of the electricity price during the eligible period of 15 years from the commissioning of the offshore wind farm.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Financial consequences for social sectors | By offering as much continuity as possible in the roll-out of offshore wind energy, TenneT's delay costs, which are included in the grid tariffs, are limited as much as possible.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Targeted effectiveness                    | The sharp increase in development costs and decreased and uncertain revenues for wind farm developers have led to the emergence of an unprofitable gap that has grown rapidly. A subsidy is made available for this based on actual production. The subsidy is paid out retrospectively on the basis of the annual average electricity price.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Efficiency targets                        | <p>The subsidy only covers the unprofitable portion, the difference between the market price for energy and the cost price for generation by the wind farm. In addition, a base electricity price is used. If the electricity price falls below the base electricity price, no additional subsidy will be paid.</p> <p>With the maximum tender amount of €117/MWh, the subsidy intensity for this tender is €278/tonne CO<sub>2</sub>. This is lower than the maximum subsidy intensity for the SDE++ of €300/tonne CO<sub>2</sub>. This may be lower if the winning tender amount is lower. The final expenditure during the term then depends on the development of electricity prices. To illustrate, the average subsidy intensity of the applications in the categories of onshore wind energy in</p> |

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|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|            | <p>the SDE++ 2025 round is on average approximately €163/ton of CO<sub>2</sub>. It should be noted that production costs of offshore wind energy compared to onshore wind energy are higher due to location.</p> <p>The application of a price certainty mechanism is in line with global developments. Although the tenders abroad cannot be compared one-to-one with the Dutch tenders, these tenders give a good indication of the challenging market conditions that currently apply to offshore wind energy worldwide.</p>                                                                                                                                                   |
| Evaluation | <p>With the launch of the online consultation on the draft Ministerial Order, anyone can respond to the regulation. This offers an opportunity to adjust the draft regulation to produce the final Ministerial Order. The consultation also provides an indicator of the willingness and chance of success of the tender. After the tender has been closed, the results and success of the tender will be evaluated in order to learn from them for subsequent tenders in terms of budget reservation and tender design. These lessons will also be included as much as possible in the development of the <i>Contract for Difference</i> that must be applied from mid-2027.</p> |



This is a publication of

Netherlands Enterprise Agency  
Prinses Beatrixlaan 2 | 2595 AL Den Haag  
PO Box 93144 | 2509 AC The Hague  
T +31 (0) 88 042 42 42  
[Contact](#)  
[www.rvo.nl](http://www.rvo.nl)

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